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Ι. Thought experiments, movies, and the debate on personal identity: Justifying 
the connection
Ever since the classical era there has been “a long-standing antagonism between poetry and philosophy.”1 Plato’s idea of the philosopher is that of a person who has somehow managed to exit the cave, has 
seen the truth, and returns with the obligation to reveal to others the 
truth he has become aware of. In Plato’s view the philosopher’s task is 
to present things the way they truly are and persuade others by means of 
sound argumentation. Contrary to philosophy, poetry is only entitled to the 
1 Plato, The Republic, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 607b.
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subjective interpretation of the truth. Poetry and painting are seen by Plato 
as two forms of monoperspective representation prone to presenting things 
not as they truly are, but as they might, or might not be.2
This ‘Platonic’ antagonism between philosophy and art in general is still 
a valid standpoint. However, arguments in favor of this alleged dichotomy 
between philosophy and literature are being challenged by contemporary 
thinkers, and several scholars reject the thesis that such an opposition 
exists indeed. The basic arguments of the counter-dichotomy (or, counter-
discontinuity) thesis are that:
i. At least some works of literature present genuine and maybe 
even novel philosophical arguments that are of the same quality 
as the best of any bona fide philosophy.3
ii. We have no reason to consider literature and philosophy to be 
dramatically different: (as they) both confront us with nonactual 
situations.4 
Based on the counter-discontinuity approach one could make a correlation 
between philosophy and fiction, or, and this is exactly where this paper will 
focus, between thought experiments and science-fiction movies. Both thought 
experiments and sci-fi movies are indeed imaginative ways of illustrating and 
comprehending a problem. Damir Smiljanić suggests that especially issues 
related to “possible worlds, problems of identity and ethical dilemmas”5 
could be presented equally well by means of thought experiments and/or sci-
fi books and movies, because both combine philosophical argumentation and 
narration.6 One could come up with an argument against the discontinuity 
thesis by providing correlating examples from thought experiments and sci-
fi movies that suggest possible answers to issues related to the fragility of 
identity. The fact that movies about identity-related issues are often filmed in 
2 The reference is to Book II of The Republic: “When a storyteller gives us the wrong impression 
of the nature of gods and heroes. It’s like an artist producing the pictures which don’t look like 
things he was trying to draw.” Plato, The Republic, 377c.
3 Bence Nanay, “Philosophy versus Literature? Against the Discontinuity Thesis,” The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 71, no. 4 (2013): 352.
4 Ibid., 351.
5 Damir Smiljanić, “Upotreba misaonih eksperimenata u filozofiji i filmu,” Kultura 142 (2014): 
39 [translated from Serbian by the author].
6 The view that thought experiments can be seen as a composition of argumentation and narra-
tion is similar to the one reached by Sören Häggqvist: “Thought experiments are not identical 
to arguments, they have to be seen as intimately connected to certain arguments.” See Sören 
Häggqvist, “A Model for Thought Experiments,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 1 
(2009): 57.
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such a way as to force the spectators to participate as puzzle-solvers, makes 
these movies even more philosophical in nature.7
Furthermore, identity-related movies can become an inspiration for 
philosophers to create engaging thought experiments.8 No less significantly 
the storyline of a sci-fi book or movie can be placed in a different context, 
where the correlation between the problem presented in the movie is 
interwinned with a similar problem presented in the thought experiment, 
or another movie. Last but not least, the connection between thought 
experiments and movies is also valid due to that thought experiments are 
usually designed in such a way, as to hightlight the most important part of 
the issue that is under examination, exactly as movies are structured around 
the most important scene, that is sometimes repeated during the movie. 
II. Who am I actually? A thought experiment on the possibility of social, 
physical and psychological identity change
Let’s discuss the following – imaginary, though logically permissible – case.9 
Michael and Rodney are monozygotic twins, but their lives are completely 
different: Michael is successful, affluent, and has a family of his own; currently 
he is the CEO of a high-profile company. On the other hand, life hasn’t been 
that kind to Rodney: he lives alone and is currently unemployed. What is 
most important for this thought experiment, is that Rodney and Michael look 
identical: Their only physical dissimilarity is a tiny birthmark: a faint scar on 
one of Rodney’s left foot toes (1).10
On their birthday night Michael and Rodney go out to celebrate; after 
several hours of consuming large quantities of alcohol, Michael and Rodney 
have to decide whether they should drive back home, or take a taxi; Michael 
insists that he was sober enough to drive, and convinces Rodney to get into 
the car. This reckless decision of theirs proved fatal: a few minutes later their 
car crashed with another. The driver in the other car was killed on the spot; 
Michael got severely injured and was out cold, while Rodney only suffered 
7 See Warren Buckland, ed., Hollywood Puzzle Films (New York & London: Routledge, 2014). 
Also, Thomas Elsaesser, “The Mind-Game Film,” in Puzzle Films: Complex Storytelling in Con-
temporary Cinema, ed. Warren Buckland, 13-41 (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
8 For example, the thought experiment I will present later on has been partly inspired by Damir 
Smiljanić’s lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, during which he discussed extensively John 
Woo’s film Face Off, and partly by Robert Louis Stevenson’s novel The Strange Case of Dr 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.
9 Thought experiments differ from scientific ones; they allow us to test our assumptions in 
non-factual situations. My thought experiment consists in a possible – yet, not real – course 
of events. 
10 The key steps of the thought experiment are highlighted in italics, and are also numbered.
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minor injuries. Michael’s injuries looked fatal to Rodney; convinced that 
his brother was going to die anyway, Rodney decides to steal Michael’s 
identity and live his brother’s – much more lucrative – life. Rodney replicates 
his birthmark on Michael’s toe, an identification mark that only Rodney had 
prior to this moment (2). Rodney switches documents and wears his brother’s 
wedding ring on his finger (3).
As soon as the ambulance arrives Michael is taken to the hospital, and 
Rodney tells the police that he, Rodney,11 was the driver. Afterwards, Rodney 
and Marie (Michael’s wife to whom Rodney presenst himself as his brother, 
Michael) visit Michael in the hospital; Michael’s condition is critical, so the 
last think one would think of is to check for the faint scar on his toe. Michael 
has Rodney’s identity card on him, and no wedding ring on his hand. Thus, 
everyone is convinced that it is Rodney the person who lies in bed heavily 
injured. This is the moment when the first identity change occurs; it is a 
change of social identity.12 Rodney presents himself as Michael, and injured 
Michael is presented as Rodney (4).
Michael is in a comatose state; Rodney is worried that his tiny little 
birthmark could compromise the identity theft; therefore, he undergoes plastic 
surgery to eliminate his scar. Now only one person has the scar, Michael. 
Scar: Rodney’s body; No scar: Michael’s body. When the scar is removed, 
Rodney’s body looks as if it is Michael’s, and Michael’s as if it is Rodney’s. This 
establishes a change in pseudo-physical identity (5).13 
After a couple of months Marie has already noticed that her husband’s 
behavior (who in fact is Rodney) is not like it used to be. She suspects that the 
person who presents himself as Michael is actually Rodney. Marie decides to 
visit the comatose twin in the hospital, so as to check whether the person who 
is supposed to be Rodney has the tiny birthmark that makes the two brothers 
discernible. After she sees the scar she rests assured that the comatose patient 
is indeed Rodney; her line of reasoning is outlined as in premise (5): Scar: 
Rodney; No scar: Michael.14
11 A man with Rodney’s documents, that is, Michael.
12 The term social identity is not easy to define. The closest to a definition could be this: social 
identity is who one is in relation to others, or who one is presumed to be. 
13 I use the greek word word pseudo as a prefix, so as to highlight the difference between 
pretending to be someone, resembling someone (physically), and being someone. For example, 
Rodney pseudo-physically is Michael, because he has changed his appearance so as to look like 
Michael. If, for example, the twins could exchange bodies or consciousness after the accident 
in some magical way, we would be justified to talk about (real) physical change and its impi-
cations.
14 Marie’s logic is flawed. According to the laws of deductive reasoning what she would only 
be justified to conclude would be that: Scar: Rodney; No scar: Not Rodney (modus tolendo 
tolens).
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This instance is of key significance for the thought experiment, since it 
is at this point that the connection between social and physical identity is 
established. The very moment Marie sees the scar, she becomes absolutely 
convinced that the person laying in the hospital’s bed is Rodney, and that 
the person who lives with her as her husband is indeed Michael (6).
While the real Michael is in a coma, his brother does his best to destroy 
everything that Michael has created. One day, though, a miracle happens: 
Michael unexpectedly wakes up. Rodney is the first to be informed; he 
rushes to the hospital, tells Michael that he (Rodney) had stolen Michael’s 
identity, and proposes a trade off; since his trial for manslaughter after 
the accident was still in progress, and the jury would probably sentence 
in several years of imprisonment the drunk driver, that is, Michael (now he 
has woken up), Michael and Rodney both agree to switch identities once 
more. Rodney will take Michael’s place and, if needed, do time instead of 
his brother; Michael, in turn, will compensate Rodney for an amount of one 
million dollars that will be transferred to Rodney’s account. Michael will 
be free to go back to his wife and do his best to save his company. 
It is important to note that this change of identity is only a social one; 
Rodney never tells Michael that Rodney has no scar, while Michael has. 
From this moment on Michael’s social identity is ‘Michael,’ even though his 
pseudo-physical identity is ‘Rodney,’ and vice versa in the case of Rodney 
(7).
When Rodney goes to the bank to open the bank account where 
Michael would transfer the agreed amount, he decides to use his fingerprint 
as an identification; even identical twins have different fingerprints.
Rodney provides a physical proof for his identity, that confirms his social 
identity as Rodney. This adds a new dimension to the thought experiment. 
A physical identification mark that cannot be duplicated would prevent 
Michael from tricking Rodney and stealing his money (8). 
This story could have a happy ending if Rodney hadn’t been killed by 
his inmates shortly after he was found guilty by the jury and incarcerated. 
The tables were turned when Marie noticed the scar on Michael’s left foot. 
It was the same scar she had seen on the hospitalized brother's toe in 
the hospital, that lead her to the conclusion that the person lying in bed 
was Rodney as shown in (6), though in fact it was Michael. Michael tells 
Marie that Rodney bears exactly the same scar; but when Rodney’s corpse 
is being checked, Michael is shocked to see that there is no such scar on 
Rodney’s leg. Marie is now pretty much sure that the person she lives with 
and presents himself as Michael is in fact Rodney who has stolen Michael’s 
identity, and that the one who died in prison is actually Michael.
Rodney dies in prison; Marie notices the scar on Michael’s leg; Rodney’s 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 04:14:49 |
[ 76 ]
DAVID MENČIK IDENTITY THEFT: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT ON THE FRAGILITY OF IDENTITY
corpse has no scar. Marie concludes that Rodney, the twin with the scar, 
stole Michael’s identity; Michael, the twin without the scar, has died in 
prison (9).
Because of this totally unanticipated course of events, Michael loses 
everything. When he goes to the bank, he is denied acess to the account 
due to the mismatch between his and Rodney’s fingerprint. For all intents 
and purposes Michael is now socially Rodney because everybody thinks he is 
Rodney. At the same time, as far as the bank is concerned, he can’t be Rodney, 
since his fingerprint doesn’t match. Pseudo-physically Michael should be 
Rodney if the scar was to be the only determinant, but physically he is still 
Michael. Michael doesn’t know who he is anymore; everything on him tell 
others that he is Rodney, but he knows he is not. In a moment of despair 
Michael loses it and kills himself. His last words left in a note were: “Who am 
I actually?”
Michael's fingerprint is different; socially he is both Rodney and not 
Rodney; pseudo-physically he is Rodney; Michael doesn’t know who he is and 
kills himself (10).
III. Implications of the “Who am I actually” thought experiment and correlations 
with Christopher Nolan’s The Prestige and Derek Parfit’s ‘Divided Minds’
a. Determinism and social identity changes
This thought experiment includes four changes in social identity. An issue 
that needs to be addressed is whether these changes occurred due to the free 
will of the persons involved, or were determined by factors external to the 
agents. It is obvious that the first change in both brothers’ social identity 
is voluntary for Rodney, and involuntarily for Michael (3, 4). But still, even 
in the case of Michael, it cannot be deemed pre-determined. The identity 
exchange in (7), when the brothers decided to switch back again, has been 
voluntarily for both. This identity change is partially pre-determined and 
partially not, since it was step (3) that led to it, but the brothers didn’t need 
to change their social identities back. The third major social identity change 
happens in (9), when Michael is socially restored as Rodney. This change is 
completely involuntary since it is determined by steps (1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7), that 
is, all the steps that precede it, and include previous social identity changes, 
as well as pseudo-physical identity changes. Another important factor as far 
as the pre-determinated character of this identity change is concerned, is the 
fact that Marie reaches the wrong conclusion regarding Michael’s physical 
identity while Michael was in a coma. The final social identity (10) is also 
involuntary and directly determined by (8), and indirectly determined by all 
previous steps. The fact that, as it is shown in the thought experiment, it is not 
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always us who decide whether our social identity will stay the same or not, 
leads to the question on why is social identity often as fragile as it has shown 
to be in the case of Michael.
b. The fragility of social identity, Michael’s case, and the ‘canary switch’
The thought experiment I presented above was intented to show that 
social identity can easily be altered. It may even seem that social identity 
is just an illusion. It is easy to fool other people in believing that one is 
the person one claims to be.15 In Michael’s case the fragility of social 
identity is shown in step (3), when his identity is stolen by Rodney by 
simple actions like exchanging documents and stealing a wedding ring. 
Furthermore, Michael’s case shows that one can easily be mistaken for the 
person one is not (6, 9), and also that it may be not as easy to provide a 
solid proof of one’s social identity in the case an identity theft occures 
(10). 
The ‘canary switch’ scene in Christopher Nolan’s film The Prestige 
presents masterfully the fragility of social identity. In the scene a canary 
is put in a cage on a table, and the cage is covered with a magician’s scarf. 
The magician smashes the cage with his hand; then he removes the scarf 
and the cage as well as the canary have just vanished into thin air. Right 
after, the magician conjures the canary up safe in the scarf. The trick is 
performed twice during the film, and both times Nolan focuses on the 
impact it has on the spectators – it is awe and horror.16 When the full 
version of the trick is exhibited, the truth is revealed: the table has a secret 
trap hatch, and right below the hatch is attached a compartment for the 
cage. The canary is being smashed indeed, and the trick lies in that it is 
artfully replaced by a ‘twin’ canary. What connects my thought experiment 
to Nolan’s canary switch is the illusion of empirical singularity. 
An illusion involving the use of doubles functions through the 
dissimulation of the plurality of an object whereby the pledged 
15 One’s social identity is not one’s possession, nor an intrinsic attribute of one’s essence. It is, 
after all, the only kind of identity that can be stolen, as it is shown in my thought experiment. 
For example, Rodney was able to steal Michael’s social identity, just because he needed to 
convince other people that he is Michael. Fooling others was easy, since Michael and Rodney 
looked almost the same. On the other hand, Rodney could have never stolen Michael’s psy-
chological identity, because this kind of identity is inherent in one’s essence as a part of one's 
consciusness.
16 The feeling of horror emerges when one realizes what the trick consists in, as it happens when 
Nolan shows a boy having realized that the canary presented at the end of the trick is not the 
initial one, and asking: “But where’s his brother?” Christopher Nolan, and Jonathan Nolan, The 
Prestige: Screenplay (London: Faber & Faber, 2006), 19.
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object does disappear or even die, but is immediately replaced 
by something else which looks exactly the same as the thing 
which was made to disappear.17 
Though my scenario doesn’t involve any disappearance trick, it nevertheless 
addresses the issue of the logical association between uniqueness (or, singularity) 
and duality, as the identity of both Rodney and Michael becomes dual at several 
instances. Marie, for example, believes that the birthmark on Rodney’s toe is unique, 
and that it is therefore a proof that the person that bears it is Rodney. Rodney’s 
identity can also be understood as dual because he is both Rodney (physically and 
psychologically) and Michael (pseudo-physically and ocassionally socially) at the 
same time. Rodney’s duality consists in the fact that he is both himself as well 
as an impersonation of Michael, and the same applies to Michael, who is also an 
impersonation of Rodney (pseudo-physically and socially). 
In my view all four types of personal identity I outlined in my thought 
experiment are interrelated.18 The ‘canary switch’ scene in Christopher Nolan’s film 
seems also capable of providing support to arguments in favor of the fragility of 
social identity. However, the fragility-of-identity hypothesis seems to be in need of 
further support; such support, I believe, could be sought in Derek Parfit’s ‘divided 
minds’ thought experiment.
c. Psychological and physical identity: The originality of a replicated being
The problem of creating an identical copy of something that is presumed to be 
unique has fueled a persistent ontological debate that starts with Plato’s discussion 
of mimesis and is present all the way through up to the critique of the ‘cultrual 
industry’ by Horkheimer. In “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” 
Walter Benjamin describes the mechanism of reproduction as follows:
The technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object 
from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it 
substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence.19 
17 Kwasu David Tembo, “On the Work of the Double in Christopher Nolan’s The Prestige,” in 
The Cinema of Christopher Nolan: Imagining the Impossible, ed. Jacqueline Furby, and Stuart 
Joy, 201-218 (London & New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 203.
18 Pseudo-physical identity and social identity are similarly structured, and are equally external 
to one’s essence. I will argue that we could speak of four identities, provided that we keep in 
mind that the pseudo-physical identity doesn’t exist per se; it requires a connection between 
social and physical identity. This identity emerges during our interaction with others (social 
identity) on the basis of how we look like (physical identity). This is why we may change our 
identity to look like someone else (pseudo-physical identity), so that other people will think 
that we are another person.
19 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations, 
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In their Dialectic of Enlightenment Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer 
argue that the cultural industry has set out to reproduce everything that 
exists in the world: real-world objects are replicated by literature and the 
movie industry, and this results in the alienation from one’s self, others, and 
real world problems. The distinction between the world of reality and the 
world of fiction is lost; people’s attitude towards the world can be altered 
by regulating what they are furnished during their time of leisure, therefore 
controlling the media means enforcing conformity and manipulation.20 In their 
works Adorno, Horkheimer, and Benjamin have discussed the devaluation of 
actuality in a world that relies on omnipresent reproduction. My focus here is 
not on political theory, of course; the issue that concerns originality and the 
way it is related to value, however, is definitely a common thread.
The question is whether creating identical copies of existing persons 
would compromise those persons’ uniqueness or not. Leaving aside the 
various possible bioethical dilemmas that arise from human cloning, and 
limiting the focus on the issue of identity, there are two questions that need 
to be addressed:
a. Could my replica be physically identical to me?
b. Would the existence of a living replica of mine compromise 
my psychological identity?
The answer to the first question doesn’t seem to be that complicated. If 
we had the power to create a machine that would produce replicas, like the 
one Tesla created for Angier in Nolan’s The Prestige, I could be physically 
identical to my copy if 100% of my matter was used to give existence to my 
replica without destroying me at the same time.21 However, it is important 
to note that even mere physical similarity, or should we say pseudo-physical 
identity between replicas and originals, could infringe psychological identity. 
We can see a reaction towards this infringement in Angier’s expression after 
his first replica was created: Angier is stunned and horrified at the same time. 
Angier seems to be afraid that his own identity is being compromised by the 
Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt, 217-253 (New York: Schocken Books, 1999), 221.
20 See Theodor W. Adorno, and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 111-120.
21 This, however, is neither logically possible, nor technically feasible. On the logical impossi-
bility of creating two indiscernible beings see Leibniz’s ‘identity of the indiscernibles’ priniciple, 
in Gottfried W. F. von Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew, and Daniel Garber (In-
dianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 41-42; on technical feasibility see Evangelos D. Protopapadakis, 
“Clones, Prototypes, and the Right to Uniqueness,” Agrafa – Journal of Philosophy of Psycho-
analysis 1, no. 2 (2013): 40-47, especially 42-44.
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mere existence of a replica of his, even though Angier knows that it is only 
about a duplicate, and not the ‘real him;’ this is why he eventually decides to 
annihilate it. It seems that it is almost impossible to come to terms with the 
fact that I am staring at something that is and is not me at the same time.
Parfit’s discussion is much more complex; in his ‘divided minds’ thought 
experiment Parfit discusses an imaginary situation in the context of which 
he is being ‘teletransported’ on planet Mars. During the process he loses 
consciousness and his body on Earth is being destroyed as scheduled, while 
at the same time a replicator on Mars produces a body that is absolutely 
identical with the one on Earth; his consciousness is also replicated: this 
new self has exactly the same knowledge, experiences and memories as the 
prototype.22 Both identical beings (this on Earth, and that on Mars) share 
a common physical and psychological identity; the distance between them, 
however, made possible due to the duplicate's ‘teletrasportation’ and the 
destruction of the prototype, allow for the psychological impression that 
the replica is indeed a unique self. In this part the clone in Parfit’s thought 
experiment doesn’t share Angier’s frustration due to his replication.
In the second part of the thought experiment Parfit enters the machine, 
but doesn’t get teletransportated; he is being told, instead, that “the new 
scanner records your blueprint without destroying your brain and body.”23 An 
interesting question is whether he would consent to this if he was in advance 
informed that both versions of his self would coexist, albeit in different 
places. It is inconceivable for one to be in two places at the same time. “Wait 
a minute. If I am here, I can’t also be on Mars.”24
Shortly after, the prototype on Earth is told that his cardiac system 
has been damaged due to the replication process, and that he is going to 
die, while the replica on Mars will keep on living. When the original and the 
replica communicate, they are both convinced by their conversation that, 
even though physically identical, psychologically they are not the same 
person. “Call this the Branch-Line Case [...] though he is exactly like me, he is 
one person, and I am another.”25
IV. A possible conclusion on the fragility of identity
In the first part of my article I set out to provide reasons for the methodology 
I used – both as far as my research, as well as the presentation of my results 
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are concerned. Even though the paper is quite short, and the focus has 
necessarily been narrowed down to only a few relevant cases, I believe that 
the conclusions I have reached and I am about to present could be of broader 
applicability and validity, eventhough just as hypothetical and speculative. 
Reaching speculative conclusions goes hand in hand with thought experiments, 
since they are just allegories intended not to prove, but to showcase. On the 
other hand, as far as identity isues are concerned, thought experiments is 
the best thing we can afford, since it is unethical to examine the fragility of 
personal identity by performing experiments on human beings. 
Based on the discussion in this paper, one could reach two distinct 
conclusions. The first is that our social identity is not intrinsic to our essence; 
it almost sounds improper to speak of an identity at all, since social identity is 
entirely dependent on the objectification of one’s own self by others. Perhaps 
it would be much more appropriate to understand one’s social identity as a 
means of interaction. If persons didn’t interact, there would be no such identity 
attached to one’s self. We could imagine a situation in which a person, let’s 
say, who sufferes from total amnesia is transferred in the wilderness. Living in 
the absence of any other person, this person is socially ‘no-one,’ as nobody 
else interacts with him. Next to this, as it has already been shown previously in 
this paper, one more argument in favor of the non-actuality of social identity 
is that it can easily be abolished, or transferred to another person.
The second conclusion would be that one’s physical identity is interrelated 
with one’s social and psychological identity. For example, similarity in physical 
appearance, or what I call pseudo-physical identity, may result in the social 
identification of two persons, as it is shown in the case of Rodney with regard 
to his scar, and in the ‘canary switch’ scene in Cristopher Nolan’s The Prestige. 
Furhermore, as Parfit’s thought experiment suggests clear no less than 
Angier’s reaction to his replica, the psychological continuity of one’s identity 
would be infringed if a. the prototype and the replica coexisted in spatial and 
temporal proximity, b. either of the two was aware of the existance of the 
other.
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